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JUDICIAL TRENDS IN GRATUITOUS ASSIGNMENTS
TO AVOID FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
RALPH S. RICEt
TAXPAYERS in the higher income brackets often seek to redirect their income
to objects of their bounty in order to minimize the progressive features of the
tax. Their efforts have resulted in one of the most untidy areas in tax juris-
prudence. Housewives and infants have become operating partners, thereby
sharing (before taxes) in the paterfamilial profits, in almost every variety of
commercial enterprise susceptible of operation by a partnership. The owner
of property who gives it to another and then leases it back; the earner who
assigns the rewards for his labors either before or after his services are per-
formed; the entrepreneur who assigns his claims under long-term contracts;
and the author or inventor assigning literary or patent rights-all of these may
be engaged in efforts essentially similar in purpose. Nor are these all. The
person who assigns income rights-such as retirement benefits-arising from
past services; the owner who transfers portions of operating interests in
mineral operations, whether such interests be royalty or realty; and the person
who transfers property to a trust but retains substantial interests in the trust
likewise may be seeking to minimize tax by redirecting income. Some devices
are of early origin, but there is a constant flow of newer stratagems as the
ingenuity of taxpayers reaches ever higher levels of expression.
Legislative reaction to many of the problems raised by these gratuitous
assignments has been both sporadic and inconsistent: the Revenue Act of 1954
ignores them for the most part. judicial response likewise has been uneven
and, to a degree, illogical. Pressures on the Commissioner and the courts to
protect the public revenue have frequently resulted in ad hoc solutions to tax
avoidance problems, which in turn have given rise to an abundance of conflict-
ing generalizations. justice Holmes once announced that an anticipatory
assignment of earnings could not minimize federal income tax liability because
fruits may not be "attributed to a different tree from that on which they
grew."' The metaphor has been substituted for rational analysis by courts and
commentators to the point where a critic in this area frequently cannot see the
forest for the fruit trees. Metaphors lead nowhere: the number and extent of
the tax avoidance devices that have been employed here make a more analytical
approach imperative if rational results are to be achieved.
If the judicial responses to the problem of gratuitous assignments have a
rational basis, it needs to be stated. The data from which the incidence of tax
liability must be predicted should not be merely a scattering of decisions based
on no common theory or-what is worse-based on every imaginable theory
for cases that are essentially the same.
tProfessor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
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THE JUDICIAL PROBLEM IN CASES INVOLVING GRATUITOUS ASSIGNMENTS
To begin at the beginning, we must remind ourselves that no federal income
tax is ever payable except as the Internal Revenue Code requires it, and in
the usual case that requirement is imposed because the person taxed has "in-
come" under section 61 of the Code. The section does not, however, inform
us as to when income is taxed to some person other than the actual recipient.
The answer to this question must be sought by the courts in most cases without
guidance from the statute itself.
There is no question but that in some cases a person should not be allowed
to avoid income taxation by gratuitously assigning a part of his income, or
property from which income arises, to another. Yet one can legitimately trans-
fer property and income to another, and there is a point at which the recipient
must be considered the person to be taxed upon the income that is legally his.
There are innumerable gradations between the two extremes: the problem of
the courts is to find a test by which it can be determined on which side of the
line a given case must fall. We cannot say whether any test is adequate until
we know the reason for the distinction between the two kinds of cases-a
reason that must be sought in the broad aims of any structure of taxation.
These aims are two: first, the tax plan must be administratively feasible, in
the sense that it must produce a maximum of revenue with a minimum of
effort; and second, it must be equitable, in the sense that transactions and tax-
payers essentially similar must be treated similarly. Thus in some cases the
taxpayer who has technically assigned his income is in reality so little different
from one who has not tried to assign it that it would frustrate the basic aims
of the tax law to recognize the assignment.
It is one thing to agree that some more obvious forms of anticipatory assign-
ments should be ignored for tax purposes; it is something else again to draw
a line establishing the area of the limitation. The ethical values according to
which each jurist presumably draws the line dictated by his conscience and his
view of the public needs can scarcely be standardized. And even when agree-
ment is reached on where the line should be drawn in a specific case, there re-
mains the problem of expressing general principles to control other decisions.
This in turn is difficult when the only keys for interpreting the statute are the
requirements of workability and fairness.
The result is that the decisions actually fall far short of furnishing criteria
by which taxpayer or Commissioner may determine the extent to which a
person may reduce his taxes by redirecting income to another. The several
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the problem reflect much uncertainty
both as to the point where the lines are to be drawn and as to the tests to be
used in determining on what side of the line a given arrangement falls. In
many decisions the subject is discussed generally and reference is made to a
number of rules of potentially general application, so that it is impossible to
single out the particular doctrine, or accurately to reconstruct the analysis, on
which the Court relied. Some of these decisions seem purposely vague. In
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other cases principles are enunciated that seem reasonably applicable in some
circumstances and obviously inappropriate in others.
The following comments are an attempt to evaluate the principal doctrines
and decisions in this area-most of them utterances of the Supreme Court-
in terms of the basic aims of the tax law. Four principal doctrines will be con-
sidered:
1. The concept that one who assigns to another the right to receive
income is taxable with respect to that income because he received material
or non-material satisfactions from the transfer. This doctrine is inade-
quate because it extends taxation of the donor too far.
2. The theory that when "owmership" of "property" is transferred, the
income arising therefrom cannot be taxed to the donor. This doctrine is
inadequate because it restricts taxation of the donor too narrowly.
3. The doctrine that income is taxed to him who earns it. This prin-
ciple seems logical and has been reasonably definitive in its application.
4. The concept that where property or a right to income therefrom is
transferred but the donor retains control over the payment of the income
or control over the management and use of the corpus, the transfer is not
effective to redirect income from donor to donee for tax purposes. This
doctrine, supplemented by the preceding rule, establishes a proper theoreti-
cal basis for controlling anticipatory assignments made for the purpose of
avoiding federal income taxes.
DONOR'S SATISFACTIONS AS A BASIS FOR TAXING THE DONOR
The thought is frequently expressed that a person who obtains material or
non-material satisfaction from transferring to another his right to income
should be taxed as if payments were made to him, even where payments are
in fact made to the other. The concept stems from Hchcring z. Horst,2 where
the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer retaining a bond but transferring in-
terest coupons thereon was taxable with respect to income from the coupons:
"The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment
and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses
the income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his
right to collect it as the means of procuring them....
"Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure
a satisfaction... would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether
the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment
of his debt there, or such non-material satisfactions as may result from the
payment of a campaign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his
favorite son .... The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him
by virtue of his acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it
would have been if he had collected the interest in dollars and expended
them for any of the purposes named." 3
2. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
3. Id. at 117. The "flow of satisfactions" test elaborated here was bascd on language
in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933). It is questionable whether the principles there
enunciated should be applied elsewhere. In the TVeils case, it was held only that the
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Substantially the same view is expressed in the concept that the right to
dispose of income is equivalent to ownership of it.4 The right to dispose of
income obviously is of value only to the extent that satisfactions may be ob-
tained thereby. Exercising the right to dispose of income brings satisfactions,
and the enjoyment of those satisfactions is the equivalent of receiving taxable
income. Either doctrine means in effect that income should be taxable to one
who is entitled to it but directs payments to another; or stated otherwise, that
where one disposes of a right to receive income he will nevertheless be taxed
with its receipt.
The rule presents substantial problems. As was pointed out in Horst, in-
come is frequently attributed to a taxpayer where it is applied to the discharge
of his obligations. To the extent that an obligation is discharged for a valuable
consideration there is no doubt as to the propriety or universality of this rule.0
However, when gifts of property are involved there is a basic inconsistency in
the results of the cases. An example will illustrate the point. Assume a case
where a father owns Blackacre, which has appreciated in value. He has the
right to sell Blackacre and thus realize the accretion in value. If he does so,
he will have taxable income. He also has the right to dispose of the accretion
in value by giving Blackacre away, and in this sense has the right to dispose
of an item which, when realized, would be income. But in the usual case, we
do not tax the increment to him simply because he gave it away, whether he
receives a "satisfaction" from the gift or not." Moreover, it may be said that
the father had a right to rentals from Blackacre, and has disposed of that
right to income along with the property. But it would seem that having given
Blackacre away, he should no longer be taxed on the rentals, notwithstanding
that payment of the income to the son provides a satisfaction to the father. And
so it was held by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Stuart 7 that a father
making such a transfer in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children
was not taxable on income received by the trustee solely because he had once
owned the property. This view has been adopted in regulations promulgated
by the Commissioner."
The Court's attempt in the Stuart case to harmonize its decision with the
rationale of the Horst case is expressive of a confusion seldom equaled in
Supreme Court history. The Court first observed that it was being invited to
hold that trust income was taxable to the grantor of the corpus simply on the
satisfaction obtained by the donor was sufficient so that Congress could constitutionally
tax him. This single decision is far from authorizing the holding that the law does tax
the assignor of income simply because receipt thereof by the assignee would cause tile
donor satisfaction.
4. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1941).
5. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), and cases
discussed in notes 58 and 79 infra. For the current law respecting payment by a lessee
of the lessor's taxes, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 110.
6. See discussion at pp. 1006-08 infra.
7. 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
8. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-21 (1953).
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basis that use of the income "would satisfy the normal desire of a parent to
make gifts to his children." 9 It declined this invitation, partly on the ground
that "no act of Congress manifests such an intention."' 0 This argument seems
bootless: to no greater extent did any act of Congress manifest an intention to
tax the donor in many other cases where he was in fact taxed. The Court then
observed that "economic gain realized or realizable by the taxpayer is neces-
sary to produce a taxable income .. ."I' But such an argument proves
nothing. For example, gain was never realized (in the sense of becoming
accrued or paid to the person taxed) in the Horst case itself, and the donor
there was taxed nonetheless. Apparently one criterion for determining when
gain is realized by a donor was to be used in Horst and the cases it cites, while
another concept is to be used in the Stuart case: exactly what those concepts
are or why there should be a distinction is left to the imagination of the reader.
Next the Court said that in Horst it had observed that there the donor had
the "use [realization] of his economic gain." But it was not explained in just
what respect the same observation was not equally applicable in the Stuart
case, though it was suggested that in none of the earlier cases "had the tax-
payer really disposed of the res which produced the income."12 This would
seem to throw us into the so-called "property" concept respecting redirection
of income. As will be shown, this concept has frequently been rejected by the
Supreme Court, and seems unsound in any event.13 Finally, the Court ob-
served, citing the Horst case, that "the 'non-material satisfactions' (gifts-con-
tributions) of a donor are not taxable as income."'14 This observation is in-
comprehensible. The Horst case in fact held just the contrary. All in all, it
must be said that the Stuart decision expresses a result without a reason, but
that the result unquestionably represents current law.
All we know from Horst and Stuart is that sometimes a flow of satisfactions
results in taxability to a donor and sometimes it does not." We must still
search for a doctrine that will rationalize the disparate results of the cases.
TRANSFER OF "OWNERSHIP" OF "PROPERTY" AS A GROUND FOR TAXING
THE DONEE
Another elementary but elusive concept is that a transfer of "ownership" of
"property" is effective to eliminate future taxation of the donor wvith respect




13. See pp. 995-1000 infra.
14. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 16S (1942).
15. While the doctrine will not stand analysis, there has been occasional reference
to it since the Horst case. See, e.g., Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952) ;
Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942). But see Estate of
Holmes, 1 T.C. 508 (1943). Similar emphasis on the flow of satisfactions enjoyed by the
donor is found in some cases where a donor has conveyed property in trust for a bene-
ficiary. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bateman, 127 F.2d 266 (lst Cir. 1942) ; Commissioner
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to income from that property. It is important to note that this doctrine has
two facets. One facet is seen in cases where a transferor gives away title to a
corpus-ownership of the exploited property. It is not infrequently said in this
situation that the taxable income follows the ownership of the property. 10 In
this sense, ownership means passage of legal title. This concept conflicts with
the doctrine that where property is transferred from one person to another and
the donor retains substantial "control" over it, subsequent income is taxed to
the donor. This facet of the "property" concept will be considered in connec-
tion with the "control" doctrine.17
The other facet of the "ownership" concept is the view that where property
that is itself essentially a right to income is transferred, the income is taxed to
the donee even though the donor retains the corpus from which the income
arose. Such a case might arise where an individual licenses a patent and
transfers the license, with his right to receive payments under it, while retain-
ing the patent. It has been suggested that the donor should be relieved of tax
because he transferred property in the sense that he completely gave up
dominion over the license.' s
The leading exposition of this doctrine is in Blair v. Commissioner,1' where
a life beneficiary of a trust assigned a portion of his interest to his children, to
be paid to them annually for the duration of his interest. The Court concluded
that this assignment was effective to redirect income from the donor to the
donee on the ground that the "assignment of the beneficial interest is not the
assignment of a chose in action but the 'right, title and estate in and to prop-
erty.' "20 The Court thought that since the assignee became "the owner of an
equitable interest in the corpus of the property," the income therefrom was
properly taxable to him.21
Subsequent decisions belie the clarity and simplicity of this formulation in
Blair, and some cases specifically reject the concept. Even prior to the Blair
decision, the Supreme Court had considered a case in which taxpayer assigned
half his partnership interest to his wife. The taxpayer urged that the assign-
ment to his wife was of one-half the "corpus" of his interest and that this
"corpus" produced the income in question. The Court observed that "the
characterization does not aid the contention."'22 The Blair rationale was ig-
nored in a case where a taxpayer assigned for one year his beneficial interest
v. Wilson, 125 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Mairs v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941);
Whitely v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1941).
16. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 554 (1942) ; Blair v. Commissioner, 300
U.S. 5, 12 (1937).
17. This doctrine is discussed at pp. 1013-16 infra.
18. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rothensies, 61 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd per curam,
150 F2d 959 (3d Cir. 1945). See also cases cited in notes 29 and 30 infra.
19. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
20. Id. at 13-14.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 141 (1932). See also Burnet v. Wells, 269
U.S. 670 (1933).
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in a trust. The Commissioner taxed him on the income from the trust for that
year, over his objection that he had parted with the ownership of property
when he made the assignment. The Supreme Court observed that the tax-
payer
"rests his case on technical distinctions affecting the conveyancing of
equitable interests. It is said that since by the assignment of trust income
the assignee acquires an equitable right to an accounting by the trustee
which, for many purposes, is treated by courts of equity as a present
equitable estate in the trust property, it follows that each assignee in the
present case is a donee of an interest in the trust property for the term
of a year and is thus the recipient of income from his own property....
[W]e think that the operation of the statutes taxing income is not depen-
dent upon such 'attenuated subtleties'. ."..,23
In another case subsequent to Blair the "ownership" approach was even
more emphatically rejected. Here a donor was taxed on income from property
that he had put in trust. Again the taxpayer claimed that the transfer was
effective to redirect income because he had ceased to be the owner of property
after the transfer. The Court observed:
"Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or
the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a refuge
from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue. That issue is whether
the grantor after the trust has been established may still be treated, under
this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus."2 -4
Leaving authority to one side, the deficiencies of the "ownership" doctrine
are obvious. For a basic aim of the tax structure is equitable distribution of
the tax burden, and feudal property concepts concerning "ownership" of
"property" are irrelevant in such a context. A taxpayer seeking unfairly to
23. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, $SO-S1 (1941). The decision was based tn
the "control" theory considered at pp. 100S-16 infra. It should be noted, however,
that the Court did not discountenance the result in the Blair case, although it was invited
to do so.
24. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). Lower courts have made com-
ments to the same effect. For example, the Tax Court rejected a device by which a tax-
payer transferred "legal title in and to a beneficial interest in and to" certain stock.
Loretto Al. Richards, 19 T.C. 366 (1952). It iwas observed by the third circuit that
"the factors are not the niceties of title but the controls retained by the settlur." Brown
v. Commissioner, 131 F2d 640, 641 (3d Cir. 1942).
The present discussion is limited to gratuitous transfers, but it should be observed
that there is some correlation between this subject and the problem of determining when
a sale of future income from property will be treated as sale of a capital asset. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has held that proceeds paid a lessor upon cancellation of a
lease should be treated as income rather than capital gain. Hort v. Commissioner, 313
U.S. 28 (1941). This result is consistent with holdings that assignment of future rentals
from property is not effective to redirect income. See Ward v. Commissioner, 58 F.2d
757 (9th Cir. 1932); Clifford R. Allen, Jr., 12 T.C. 227 (1949). It has been said, how-
ever, that when all of the rights of the assignor as landlord are transferred, the assign-
ment is effective to redirect income to the assignee. Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F2d 356
(3d Cir. 1945). See also notes 29 and 30 infra.
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avoid the progressive features of the tax should not be able to succeed merely
by showing that what he transferred could technically be categorized as prop-
erty. A second deficiency arises in part from the first. Words like "owner-
ship" and "property" are susceptible of many different meanings. Their proper
import can be ascertained only by examining their rational relation to the
problem they concern. Since the common law indicia of "ownership" and
"property" have little rational relation to equitable tax distribution, they do
not help to define the terms, and the decisions dealing with the terms in a tax
context are hardly more helpful. The courts have suggested nothing more
definitive than that a donor desiring to avoid income tax liability may not
retain "substantial" interests or the "substance" of ownership ;25 that the motto
"To be rather than to seem" must be applied ;26 and that the "import and
reasonable construction of the taxing act" must control.27 Furthermore, if the
"ownership" doctrine were consistently applied in all cases, it would open the
door wide to all kinds of tax evasion. Every time any person made an antici-
patory assignment-even, for example, one of wages earned in the past-he
could successfully avoid tax on the income on the ground that he had trans-
ferred property. This logical extension of the doctrine has long been rejected
by the courts, as it should be.
It might have been expected that the judicial denunciations of the "property"
concept, coupled with its inherent deficiencies, would long since have brought
about its demise. The fact is, however, that in some areas of tax law cases are
still being decided on the basis that a transfer of the ownership of property is
effective to redirect income from donor to donee. This has been the rationale
of decisions holding that gifts of oil in place and in-oil payments are effective
to redirect income from assignor to assignee.28 It likewise accounts for de-
25. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948) ; Loretto M. Richards,
19 T.C. 366, 376 (1952) ; Verne Marshall, 1 T.C. 442, 447 (1943).
26. Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1945).
27. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581 (1941); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. lll,
114 (1930).
28. See, e.g., Porter Royalty Pool, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 933 (6th Cir.
1948) ; United States v. Spalding, 97 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1938) ; T. W. Lee, 42 BT.A.
1217 (1940). Cf. Edward G. Swartz, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1934)
(assignment of rights to cut timber effectual to redirect income to the assignee). The
Internal Revenue Service now takes the position that "the assignment of any in-oil
payment right . . . which extends over a period less than the life of the depletable
property interest from which it is carved, is essentially the assignment of expected
income from such property interest." I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10, 11. This seems
clearly in accordance with the rejection of the "property" concept in other areas.
However, it was held in Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954), that a temporary
assignment of an oil payment constituted a transfer of property. The Treasury ruling
was also rejected in a split decision holding that such an assignment is of a "tree" rather
than "fruit"; of "property" rather than "income." Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567
(5th Cir. 1955) (assignment of in-oil payments for consideration resulted in capital gains
rather than ordinary income treatment). The dissenting judge observed that by the
assignment of the oil payment "the taxpayer is merely collecting some of his royalty in-
come in advance." Id. at 575.
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cisions to the effect that the transfer of an entire lease by a lessor-owner will
redirect income thereunder to the assignee even though the assignor remains
the owner of the leased property.2 9 In substance a transfer of income is there
involved; in form the ownership of property is transferred. Decisions on the
"property" basis persist 30 notwithstanding that the broad language of Com-
-missioner v. Suiznen,3' striking down an assignment of contractual rights under
patents, affords a basis for expecting that no assignment of a contract would
thereafter be effective to redirect income.
The vestiges of the property concept, manifested in the foregoing cases,
should be eradicated. As will be shown later in some detail,32 there is little
justification for permitting a taxpayer to redirect income from his own per-
sonal services to a donee, even though those services are embodied in a copy-
right, literary property, patent or invention. There is absolutely no justifica-
tion for permitting the person owning such property to redirect part of the
proceeds of it by assigning a lease or royalty agreement while retaining control
of the basic property. Likewise, there seems to be no justification for saying,
as some courts have,33 that gratuitous assignment of an entire lease will be
29. See, e.g., Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1945); Midwood Asso-
dates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 115 F2d 871 (2d Cir. 1940) (semble) ; Ward v. Commis-
sioner, 58 F2d 757 (9th Cir. 1932) (seuble). The "property" concept was also relied
upon where a taxpayer transferred a valuable contract to a corporation and gave stock
to members of his family. Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144 F2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944).
In a very few decisions, courts have relied upon this concept in cases where the donor
assigned the ownership of property to a trustee. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Helvering, 140
F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1944). But see Wood v. Commissioner, 74 F2d 78 (6th Cir. 1934);
Loretto M. Richards, 19 T.C. 366 (1952).
30. Note, e.g., emphasis on the "property" concept in the treatment of an assignment
of a contract for royalties, in Morris Cohen, 15 T.C. 261 (1950). See also notes 45 and
46 infra. In Arthur T. Galt, 19 T.C. 892 (1953), aft'd, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954),
it was held that the assignment of a percentage of lease receipts to children of the donor
was ineffective to redirect the income, but both the Tax Court and the court of appeals
were careful to reserve decision on the effect of a transfer of the entire lease.
31. 333 U.S. 591 (1948). See also Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932).
This discussion is not primarily concerned with instances in which a transferor is
charged with income which he has assigned to another in a business transaction. However,
principles enunciated in the cases dealing with gratuitous transfers have not infrequently
been invoked in the context of arms-length transactions. The concept that where "owner-
ship" of "property" is transferred the income from the property is taxable to the trans-
feree has, for example, been relied upon to support an allocation of income to a wife
receiving income from a trust providing for separation payments. Pearce v. Commissioner,
315 U.S. 543 (1942). But the concept was rejected where the claimed transfer of property
in trust was found to be only a transfer as security for alimony payments. Longyear v.
Helvering, 77 F2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1935). The same theory w%,as invoked where a taxpayer
assigned a portion of his interest in an annuity to another for a consideration. The Tax
Court thought the assignor should not thereafter be taxed with the annuity income since
he had completely assigned his interest in the "property," i.e., the annuity. Estate of
Laughlin, 8 T.C. 33 (1947).
32. See text at notes 45-48 infra.
33. See cases cited note 29 supra.
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sufficient to redirect income from assignor to assignee simply because the lease
is property. Neither does there seem to be any legitimate usefulness in a
theory that allows a person having a right to income from minerals to transfer
a royalty agreement or an in-oil payment and thus redirect income to another
on the ground that he is transferring property.
It is of course true that the "property" concept might properly be applied
to cases such as those where a taxpayer conveys absolute title to real estate,
the rentals from which are thereafter collected by the donee. But the fact that
the doctrine may be applicable in some circumstances does not demonstrate
that it should be imposed in all, and the "property" concept in itself offers no
indication as to when it is applicable and when it is not. An opinion from the
second circuit, which has wrestled mightily with the problem, illustrates the
difficulty. The court noted that:
"what is relevant to 'ownership' in determining the niceties of rights or
duties under the rules concerning trust estates may need to be disregarded
in applying the cruder test of taxability; in the law of trusts the cutting
edge of the pertinent rule must be razor-sharp, while in income tax law,
involving so sweeping a provision as Section 22(a), the helpful image is
rather that of a broad-sword. '3 4
The scholar seeking a formula by which to predict the outcome of cases using
the "property" concept might well conclude that a more appropriate judicial
image would project an implement from the barnyard rather than the battle-
field.
TAXING INCOME TO THE ONE WHO EARNS IT
Income That Has Already Been Earned
Courts have frequently asserted that income is taxable to the one who earns
it. Thus it was said in Helvering v. Horst 3r that
"the rule that income is not taxable until realized has never been taken
to mean that the taxpayer, even on the cash receipts basis, who has fully
enjoyed the benefit of the economic gain represented by his right to receive
income, can escape taxation because he has not himself received pay-
ment .... "36
Clearly this doctrine contemplates at the very least the case of a person who
owns property or has performed services, and who, before the earnings there-
from formally accrue, assigns his right to the income to another. In such a case
it might well be said that the taxpayer has been vested with the right to the
income at the time of the assignment, and therefore should be taxed upon it.
The doctrine that income is taxed to the one who has earned it is unquestion-
ably established, workable law. A primary case in this area is Lucas v. Earl,37
34. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 1941).
35. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
36. Id. at 116.
37. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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where a taxpayer was held taxable on earnings he had assigned to his wife
before he earned them. A fortiori, his tax status would have been no more
favorable if he had made the assignment after the income was earned though
before it was paid. And so it has been held that where an employer makes
payments to a trustee for the benefit of an employee and his family, the income
should be taxed to the employee.38 Similarly, where an employer pays insur-
ance premiums for the benefit of the employee's family, the employee is taxed
on the premiums as income.3 9
The principal difficulty with the rule is that it is not consistently applied in
cases where taxpayers seek to transform earnings into a capital asset. To the
extent that the "property" doctrine previously discussed is applied, presum-
ably a person might escape the tax by giving away his earnings in the guise of
property. Thus, a taxpayer may earn income from sales of insurance, part of
the income being paid currently as commissions and part in the form of re-
newal commissions to be paid in the future. Whether this right is called a
chose in action or described by some other name, it is intangible property.
When the owner transfers it, the property is owned by the donee. In the
donee's hands it is, of course, not "earnings." Should the donor nevertheless
be taxed with respect to the sums received by the donee? Has the donor
assigned "earnings" or "property"? Where a donor assigns the fruits of his
labor can it ever be said that what he assigns is not earnings? These ques-
tions were answered by the decision in Helvering v. Eubank,40 a thoroughly
uninformative opinion holding that the donor should be taxed with respect to
income arising from renewal commissions, notwithstanding a transfer of his
rights therein to his wife. No suggestion was made as to the line of distinction
between transfers of earnings and transfers of property. Other decisions con-
38. Comer v. Davis, 107 F2d 355 (5th Cir. 1939); J. H. McEwen, 6 T.C. 1018
(1946).
39. Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1937); Canaday v. Guitteau, 86
F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1936). See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-3 (1953). Similar
conclusions have been reached in similar cases without reference to this doctrine, reliance
being placed on the general undesirability of tax avoidance. Jones v. Page, 102 F2d 144
(5th Cir. 1939). Occasionally donors have sought unsuccessfully to redirect income
through closely held corporations. V. U. Young, 5 T.C. 1251 (1945) ; Ronald Mattl.%
2 T.C. 586 (1943). Other examples of the doctrine are found in Johnson v. United States,
135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Charles E. Rieben, S T.C. 359 (1947).
The rule has been rejected in more dubious circumstances: for example, in cases
where a person directs that earnings normally paid to him should be paid instead tu
charity. Commissioner v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1942). See also Hendrick
v. Commissioner, 154 F2d 90 (2d Cir. 1946); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 3922(a)-(2)
(1953). See Charles L. Jones, 2 T.C. 924 (1943), where an assignment of annuity rights
to donor's wife successfully redirected income to her.
In other cases the propriety of the rule has been ackmowledged but the rule has not been
applied to the facts presented. Estate of Blades, 15 T.C. 190 (1950).
40. 311 U.S. 122 (1940). An interesting case before Eubank, in which a court sought
to distinguish a transfer of a chose in action from transfer of earnings in this situatim,
is Van Meter v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1932).
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sidering the problem have been no more enlightening, although the courts
have frequently enough ignored the transmutation of income from earnings
to property and taxed the one who earned and then transferred the income.
This result has been reached where the services eventuated in such assorted
property as retirement rights,4 ' settlement rights arising from past services at
the termination of a business relationship,42 and contractual agreements aris-
ing from services performed by the donor.43 The same result of taxing the
donor has been reached in certain cases involving services rendered in the
creation of property-for example, where there has been an assignment of
royalties arising from patents created by the personal services of the donors.4"
On the other hand, taxpayers have sometimes been able to transmute the
results of their personal services into property which, when transferred, in-
sulates the donor from tax. For example, it seems clear that a farmer who
gives little sheep to his daughter and then provides services by virtue of which
little sheep become big sheep does not realize income thereby-the daughter is
taxed on the increase in value.45 And it has been held that where a person has
41. Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941).
42. Robert Lubets, 5 T.C. 954 (1945). Such a case may lead to a remarkable result.
The taxpayer here may be said to receive ordinary income; what he gave away was a
substitute for ordinary income. Yet in a partnership case where he sold his partnership
interest, including rights to income, he would have been considered as selling a capital
asset, i.e., property, under the doctrine of Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1950). G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 Cum. Bum. 58, adopts this view. Such a transaction with
respect to partnership interests is now governed by INT. REV. Coa ov 1954, §§ 741,
751, which in substance provide that the sale of a partnership interest will result in capital
gain except as to unrealized receivables and inventory items. Gain attributable to these
items is treated as ordinary income.
43. Strauss v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948); Lorenz Iverson, 3 T.C.
756 (1944); Ronald Mattox, 2 T.C. 586 (1943). See also Lewis v. Rothensies, 61 F.
Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd per curiam, 150 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1945). But cf. Com-
missioner v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1937).
44. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948) ; Wood Process Co., 2
T.C. 810 (1943). But cf. Byrnes v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1937). It has
been said that an assignor of royalties arising from use of his secret process (not a
patent) could be taxed on the royalties though the contract under which they arose was
assigned to another. Washington v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1936). But
the Tax Court has recently held that assignment of an entire license agreement would be
effective to redirect income from the assignor to the assignee. Morris Cohen, 15 T.C. 261
(1950). Perhaps the license agreement more closely resembles "property" than does
a right to royalties.
45. Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F2d 519 (10th Cir. 1951). See also Alexander
v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1952); Edwin F. Sandberg, 8 T.C. 423 (1947).
But see Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1942). It is difficult to reconcile
the two cases from the tenth circuit. It is even more difficult to predict the way in which
the law will develop in these cases. The Commissioner has ruled explicitly that one who
raises stock on the cash basis and donates it to an object of his bounty realizes income to
the extent of the value of the stock at the time of the gift. I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. BULL.
7. The Tax Court has evinced no enthusiasm for this result. Estate of W.G. Farrier, 15
T.C. 277 (1950). Both I.T. 3932 and I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 15, appear to have
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embodied inventive genius in a patent, a subsequent gratuitous assignment of
the patent is a transfer of property, so that income with respect to the patent
is not taxable to the donor.40 This result seemingly arises from the view that
a patent is an independent and definable species of property, rather than earn-
ings. Yet this view seems to have been rejected as to contractual interests in
copyrights 47 and trademarks, 48 where some controls over the copyright or
trademark were retained by the donor.
Another group of cases concerning the assignment of income arising from
the personal services of a donor deals with partnership and quasi-partnership
relations. The partnership problem is now regulated by statute,4 0 but the early
cases have left their traces in current doctrine respecting redirection of income.
If A performs services for B and directs B to pay his wages to C, unquestion-
ably A receives income. Suppose, however, that A performs services for which
payment is made to the A-C partnership, to which C contributes neither capital
nor services. That which would be income to A in the first example would
seem to be his income here. On the basis of one Supreme Court decision,
Commissioner v. Tower,50 it was once thought that all partnership income
would be taxable to A in such a case except to the extent that C contributed
services or capital that did not originate with A.1 The Court subsequently
denied that this was the import of the Tower case, and stated that the proper
been rejected by the fifth circuit. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
The subject is analyzed with considerable vigor and perspicacity in Miller, Gifts of Income
and of Property: What the Horst Case Decides, 5 TAx L. RE%. 1 (1949). The subject is
discussed from another point of view in the text at note 63 infra. The result suggested
there would seem preferable to that reached in Visintainer, supra.
46. While the cases are not squarely in point, this would seem to follow, a fortiori,
from such decisions as those in which gratuitous assignments of license agreements re-
specting patents were held sufficient to redirect income to the assignee. See, e.g., Byrnes
v. Commissioner, 89 F2d 243 (3d Cir. 1937); Morris Cohen, 15 T.C. 261 (19.0). In the
latter case, Cohen assigned certain patent interests which he had received from his em-
ployer pursuant to an employment agreement. It was held that the assignment of these
interests was the same as an assignment of wages and the assignor was taxed with income
therefrom. There were other services by virtue of which the donor obtained an interest
in a license agreement. This was transferred also. The latter transfer was held adequate
to redirect income, even though it would seem that the basic income would equally repre-
sent "earnings" from the donor's services whether embodied in a license or not. See al':,
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Arthur J. Gait, 19 T.C. 892 (1953 ,
aff'd, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954) (lease of real property).
47. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Sax Rohmer, 14 T.C.
1467 (1950). Contra, Wodchouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1949).
48. Estate of Dodson, 1 T.C. 416 (1943).
49. INT. REv. CODE: OF 1954, §§ 704(e), 7701(a) (2). As to the effect in partnership-
trust cases of the incorporation of the Clifford Regnlation into the statute, see note 93
infra.
50. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
51. Some earlier cases in this area had sought to resolve the issue simply by a general
reference to the doctrine that income is taxable to the one who really earns it. See, e.g.,
Schroder v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1943); Tinhoff v. Commissioner, 120
F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941).
1955] 1003
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
test was whether a bona fide partnership was truly intended.52 The opinion
was something less than illuminating, but it seems consistent with the general
rule respecting earnings. That is, income is taxed to the one who earns it: in
deciding whether income is in fact earned by a partnership or a dominant part-
ner personally, the test in the absence of a specific statute is whether a bona
fide partnership was intended. In some cases, taxpayers have tried to give
donees participating interests in businesses, stopping short of formal partner-
ship arrangements. Such quasi-partnership arrangements have met with vary-
ing success in the courts, which more often than not ignore the partnership
analogy."1
The issue in the cases involving personal services is simple. Services per-
formed for an employer should be taxable to the one who performs them even
though he assigns his right to the earnings before receipt of them. And the
same result would follow if the services were rendered by an independent con-
tractor. The result should be no different when a person renders services re-
sulting in a salable commodity such as a patent, copyright, trademark or other
inventive or literary property. Courts have not yet gone so far, but there is no
reason why they should not.54
52. Culbertson v. Commissioner, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). The problem is currently
governed by §§ 704 and 7701 (a) (2) of the Code. Note that under § 704(e) (2) a partner
performing disproportionate services for the partnership is taxed with that share of
partnership income allocable to his services, if he created other partnership interests by
gift. He cannot, merely because he is a partner, redirect the fruits of his labor to another
partner who is the object of his bounty.
53. See cases cited note 45 supra and notes 58-60 infra. For arrangements held
ineffective to redirect income in cases involving theater operations, see Yiannias v. Com-
missioner, 180 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1950); Wade Allen, 6 T.C. 899 (1946). Other cases
holding similarly include Robert F. Werner, 7 T.C. 39 (1946); Daniel J. Fry, 4 T.C.
1045 (1945). See also V.U. Young, 5 T.C. 1251, 1257 (1945) and Ronald Mattox, 2 T.C.
586 (1943) (similar attempts involving the corporate form). An example of the doctrine
in a leaseback case is Paul G. Greene, 7 T.C. 142 (1946), where the taxpayer arranged
for his wife and another to form a partnership--to which she contributed neither capital
nor services-which purchased and leased to another partnership of which the taxpayer
was dominant member certain equipment needed by the latter. It was held that amounts
received by the wife from her partnership were taxable to the husband. But cf. Woffard
v. Commissioner, 207 F2d 749 (5th Cir. 1953). For further discussion of leasebacks,
see note 87 infra.
54. In the cases here discussed, the effort is to turn earnings into property, on the
theory that a gift of property is effective to redirect income while a gift of earnings is not.
In a parallel line of cases the effort is to turn earnings into property or a capital asset,
and then sell the property, the object being to change what would be taxable as ordinary
income if received as earnings into capital which will be taxed at capital gain rates
when the item is sold or exchanged. The latter cases are not within the scope of the
present discussion, but it should be noted that the decisions in this capital gains area are
thoroughly unrealistic, and afford no authoritative rules of sufficient dignity to control
decisions respecting gratuitous anticipatory assignment of income. For a discussion of
one phase of the subject, see Plumb, Tax Effect of Sales of Life Interests in Trusts, 9 TAx
L. REv. 39 (1953); a more comprehensive discussion is to be found in Miller, Capital
Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort, 64 YALE L.J. 1 (1954). See also note
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Income Assigned Before It Is Earned
Where a person assigns a right to income that he has not yet earned, the
assignor is taxed on the income. 5 This result is desirable for the reason,
among others, that the taxpayer has control of the income to be received by
his assignee: that is, if the assignor performs no services, the assignee receives
no income. Hence it is suggested that since the assignor controls the income
it is proper to tax him with it. This doctrine appears rational enough. It is
clearly part of the "control" concept generally.r0
In summary, it may be said that the general doctrine that income must be
taxed to the earner thereof is basically sound. In the cases where the taxpayer
has not attempted to transform ordinary income into some kind of property
such as a chose in action, it is easily applied. Where the taxpayer tries to
24 supra. There seems to be little doubt that the two lines of cases involve substantially
the same problems, notwithstanding an occasional observation to the contrary. See cases
cited note 79 infra.
The Revenue Act of 1954 provides that gain from the sale of a patent is treated
as gain from the sale of a capital asset. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235. The Senate
Report recites: "Your committee has no intention of affecting the operation of existing
law in those areas without its [the statute's] scope." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. 441 (1954). The statute contains no reference to treatment of gratuitous assign-
ments as transfers of property as distinguished from income. In view of the foregoing
language, no implication with respect to the latter subject may be drawn from § 1235.
55. The leading case, of course, is Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
56. See notes 66-6 infra and accompanying text. The doctrine that earnings are
to be taxed to the earner has also found acceptance in cases where earnings are nut
transferred gratuitously. An elementary example is Leicht v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d
433 (8th Cir. 1943), where a taxpayer was taxed with salary for services although the
employer at his request applied it to discharge the employer's indebtedness to the taxpayer.
A similar result was reached where the employer paid money to a corporation designated
by the taxpayer, Saenger v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1934). Further support
for the doctrine is found in United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), where
it was held that a corporation that distributed agricultural produce in liquidation and then
sold it, paying the stockholders in cash, received income from the transaction. The court
cited the Eubank and Horst cases, and emphasized that redirection of income can no more
be accomplished by a corporate liquidation than by a direct anticipatory assignment. Sub-
stantially the same conclusion was reached in H.B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953). The
same principle was applied in taxing a corporation with receipts allocated to stockholders
during liquidation, Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952). This result seems
proper since the corporation is actually redirecting its earnings. This may be thought to
be in conflict with the case law prior to the new Code, expressed in General Utilities
& Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), where it was held that a corporation
that distributes to stockholders property that has appreciated in value does not realize
income to the extent of the appreciated value. The Lynch case, supra, may ba distinguished
from General Utilities, supra, on the basis that in Lynch the distribution consisted e:senti-
ally of earnings rather than an mrealized increment. In a case where a bank %was held
taxable with respect to the value of obligations which it first wrote Uff and then distributed
to stockholders, the majority of the court found the Horst case controlling; the dissent
claimed that the General Utilities case required a decision for the bank. Commissioner v.
First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948). The Gencral Itilifies
problem is now treated by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301, 307, 311, 312.
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convert ordinary income into disposable property, courts frequently-but not
always-ignore the attempted transmutation. In general the rule is, and should
always be, that when a claim to income arises from earnings, it will be attrib-
uted to the earner regardless of a change in its form. This should likewise be
true where services are performed on behalf of a donee, as in those cases where
the donor channels profits from business operations to a donee tinder arrange-
ments that fall short of a partnership. When the partnership device is used,
the requirements of the law are clear under recent amendments to the Code;
when those provisions are not applicable it must be ascertained whether a bona
fide partnership is truly intended. However unsatisfactory the latter concept
may be, it is not inconsistent with the principle that earnings must be taxed
to the earner.
Unrealized Increment from Property: Does It Constitute Earnings Taxable
to the Donor?
A related problem concerns assignment of property whose value has appre-
ciated in the donor's hands. It is clear that redirection of income from prop-
erty as well as from personal services, after the right to the income is fixed,
should be unavailing to avoid taxation. But the answer is not so simple when
the income from the property is in the form of an unrealized increment in its
value. An example will illustrate the problem: assume that A buys Blackacre
for farming purposes at a low price and gives it to his son twenty years later
when it has doubled in value. The son subsequently sells it and takes a profit.
A did not retain any control of the corpus of the gift-he "cut the string." At
the time of the gift he had received no income with respect to the property;
there was simply an unrealized increment in it. In such a case A would not
be taxed on the increment, for section 1015 of the Code provides that in such
cases a donee takes the donor's basis for the property. This means that when
the donee disposes of the appreciated property he will be taxed on the incre-
ment; and it would be inequitable to tax the donor as well on the same incre-
ment. Section 1015 thus suggests a general policy of not treating a gift as a
taxable realization by the donor of increment in property value, and of post-
poning taxation until the increment is realized by the donee.
But the courts have treated the donor as if he had realized the increment,
when it is clear that he has earned the increment by his own efforts in improv-
ing the property or speculating in such property. In such cases it is equitable
to tax the increment to the taxpayer just as if it were money earned and then
assigned by him. Thus where the taxpayer actively engaged in stock exchange
trading in stocks which he had given to a donee, the profits were taxed to
him.5 7 In one case a taxpayer assigned his share of a judgment against the
United States to his wife and children after collection was practically assured.
He was nevertheless taxed with the income: in the words of the court, the
57. See Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1942), where the settlor of
a trust was taxed on the value of such services.
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donees without effort of their own could smile in clear anticipation that "it was
about to snow in their hats."58 The same result has been reached in cases in-
volving claims for impounded property, 9 and corporate stock assigned after
the donor had recovered his basis and just before the corporation was liqui-
dated.6 0
Similarly, in I. T. 3932 61 the Commissioner asserted tax liability against a
father who gave livestock to his son. The father's basis for the livestock was
zero, since it had been raised on his farm. The tax was measured by the dif-
ference between his basis and the value of the livestock when it was given. In
this case there was an additional increase in the value of the livestock after the
gift to the son; and so when the son sold the livestock the problem of the son's
basis under section 1015 was squarely presented. The Commissioner solved
this problem by adding to the donee's basis as derived from the donor the
sum of the increment that had been taxed to the latter. This seems to be a
sensible solution to the problem of a two-fold increment in the value of prop-
erty gratuitously assigned. Whether it is authorized under the present statute
is dubious.62
It has been sensibly suggested that the entire problem of taxation of un-
earned increment calls for legislative consideration.0 If a taxpayer cannot re-
direct income from past or future services by anticipatory assignment, no more
should he be able to redirect income by an anticipatory assignment of the un-
58. Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.Zd 769, 772, (4th Cir. 1945). A similar result was
reached in Heyman v. Commissioner, 176 F2d 3S9 (2d Cir. 1949), in which the court
relied in part on the Doyle decision, supra.
59. Estate of S.W. Anthony, 5 T.C. 752 (1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946).
60. Tatem Wofford, 5 T.C. 1152 (1945). But see Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144
F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944); Apt v. Birmingham, 89 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. I*,wa 1950);
Theodore D. Stern, 15 T.C. 521 (1950).
Closely allied to these cases are those involving assignment of income which has arisen
or is expected to arise from construction contracts. Income has been successfully
redirected where a taxpayer obtained a construction contract, assigned it to a close-held
corporation for stock and gave the stock to his children. P. O'B. ,Montgomery, I T.C.
1000 (1943). But cf. Jones v. Page, 102 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1939) (rejecting a somewhat
similar device where the contract was assigned to a trustee). On the other hand, where
a corporation obtained the contract and assigned its right to collect money under the
contract to the stockholders, who in turn assigned their right to others, the income was
nevertheless taxed to the stckholders. Heyman v. Commissioner, 176 F2d 3S9 (2d Cir.
1949). See also Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F2d 330 (10th Cir. 1951) ;
National Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F2d 488 (8th Cir. 1939). The same con-
clusion was reached in substance in the case of Jud Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Com-
missioner, 153 F2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946). However, .ud Plumbing %as disposed of com-
pletely on the general requirements of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 41-45 that the return
of a taxpayer must clearly reflect income. This factor is frequently emphasized in these
cases. See, e.g., Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
61. 1948-2 Cum. BULL 7. A forerunner of this ruling, relating to charitable con-
tributions, is I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cum. Bu-.. 15.
62. See the discussion of this type of case at note 45 supra and accompanying text.
63. Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property: What The Horst Case Decides, 5 Tax
L REv. 1 (1949).
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earned increment on property. But until legislative action is taken, it appears
that the furthest the courts will go is to tax to the donor as income only such
items as are identifiable as arising from his personal services. This result
should follow if he speculates in the purchase and collection of a claim, or in
the raising of livestock, or in the promotion of oil recovery. Profits arising
from such activities are in substance personal earnings which are redirected to
the donee, and which should not be permitted to masquerade as unrealized
increment. But where property is assigned with an unrealized increment that
arose from a general and normal increase in the value of property, as distin-
guished from speculative gains depending on the talents and services of the
donor, the donor will not be taxed on the increment. In the absence of legis-
lative clarification, this line of distinction must be developed by the courts on
a case-by-case basis. The difficulties presented are worth tackling in order to
restrain tax avoidance through gratuitous assignments of items essentially
equivalent to earnings.
"CONTROL" OVER INCOME OR THE SOURCE OF INCOME AS A GROUND FOR
TAXING THE DONOR
Another concept used by the courts to determine the effectiveness of a
gratuitous anticipatory assignment of income turns on the extent of the con-
trol retained by the transferor over either the income or the source of income
assigned. As the Supreme Court has recently put it, the crucial question is
"whether the assignor retains sufficient power and control over the assigned
property or over receipt of the income to make it reasonable to treat him as
the recipient of the income for tax purposes."' As this language indicates,
cases dealing with "control" over income to be received in the future by the
assignee fall into two groups. One group involves the taxpayer who gives
income to another but retains some controls over the time and manner in which
the income will vest, or whether it will vest at all. The second-and much more
important-group of cases deals with income that arises from property trans-
ferred as a gift by a donor. It has already been noted that some courts have
said that where ownership of property is transferred, income therefrom is tax-
able to the donee. 65 The "control" concept is actually a modification and re-
finement of the "ownership" view. Simply stated, this concept means that
where a taxpayer gives away the ownership of property he is nevertheless
taxable on the income from the property if he retains substantial control over
it. The following discussion concerns the history, logic, and current effective-
ness of both facets of the "control" concept.
Control over Income from Future Services
We have already considered transfers of amounts previously earned by a
donor. Such sums are taxable to the donor without regard to any controls
64. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948).
65. See text pp. 995-1000 supra.
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retained by him. A different problem is presented by those cases where an
assignment of future income from services is involved. The leading case in
this area is Lucas v. Earl,60 where a husband who had assigned to his wife
income from services which he was to perform after the assignment was taxed
with respect to such income. One ground for decision suggested by the court
was that ultimate control over the income was held by the donor: "it is some-
what hard to say that the last step in the performance of those contracts could
be taken by anyone but himself alone."G7 Other cases have adopted the same
principle in somewhat more explicit terms. In one early case, for example, it
was specifically held that the donor of future earnings should be taxed as
though he received the income, since the earnings "were necessarily left within
the assignor's power, his continued activity being a condition upon them." 69
These cases demonstrate that an assignment of income to accrue from future
services is clearly unavailing to redirect income from the assignor. More than
one reason might be assigned for this result. The reason usually given is valid
and sufficient: that the donor can perform the services or not as he wishes.
Thus it is in his power to cause income to be paid to the donee or not to cause
it to be paid. When he retains such complete control over income from his
services it is appropriate to tax the income to him notwithstanding the assign-
ment.
Assiginnent of Interests in Life Estates and Similar Rights to Income
There is a group of cases where the donor has only a right to income, and
assigns that. Such cases frequently involve a life beneficiary of a trust who
assigns all or some part of his interest to another. Of course, in these circum-
stances he retains no control over the corpus from which the income arises,
since all he ever had was a right to the income, and powers purely incidental
to that right. It might very well be argued that the entire amount of the in-
come should be taxed to the donor: if he had earned a right to income to be
paid in the future and then assigned that right he would be taxed notithstand-
ing the assignment. But it can also be argued that no tax at all should there-
after be assessed against the donor: if he had owned and given away Black-acre
instead of his life estate, the gift would not involve tax liability to the donor
from future use or sale of the property. An uneasy compromise between these
views is made possible by the "control" doctrine: it can be said that if a donor
assigns his entire interest in a life estate he has relinquished all control over
the income, and so effectively redirected it to his donee for tax purposes; how-
ever, where he assigns only a portion of the income to which he is entitled,
retaining control of the remainder, it may then be said that he has not parted
66. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
67. Id. at 114.
68. Matchette v. Helvering, 81 F.2d 73, 74-75 (2d Cir. 193b). See also Rossmore v.
Commissioner, 76 F2d 520 (2d Cir. 1935); Shanley v. Bowers, 81 F2d 13 (2d Cir. 1936)
(dictum).
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with anything except a temporary or partial right to income from the life
estate which he retains.
So it may be argued that the income from a life estate should be taxed to
the donor unless he has relinquished his entire "control" of the estate-i.x.,
in substance transferred the entire life estate. The courts have in fact adopted
this view, 0 but the cases furnish little guidance in predicting the outcome of
future decisions. Two basic questions have been left unanswered: (1) for how
long the donor's control must be relinquished in order to shift the incidence of
the tax; and (2) whether the doctrine applies only to income received from
a trust or from property on a year-to-year basis. The Supreme Court has said
with respect to the time of control:
"We think that the gift by a beneficiary of a trust of some part of the in-
come derived from the trust property for a period of a day, a month or a
year involves no such substantial disposition of the trust property as to
camouflage the reality that he is enjoying the benefit of the income from
the trust of which he continues to be the beneficiary .... 70
And the Court further observed respecting general applicability of the rule:
"Unless in the meantime the difficulty be resolved by statute or treasury
regulation, we leave it to future judicial decisions to determine precisely
where the line shall be drawn between gifts of income producing property
and gifts of income from property of which the donor remains the owner,
for all substantial and practical purposes." 7'
The Court's formulation is too loosely stated to provide a practical and pre-
dictable criterion for the incidence of taxation: in each case a court must deter-
mine whether the donor has made a "substantial disposition" of his interest
so that in "reality" he is not "enjoying the benefit of the income from the trust
of which he continues to be the beneficiary."
In addition, the Court's approach is an unfortunate compromise. Under
Lucas v. Earl a taxpayer cannot minimize his tax by an anticipatory assign-
ment of earnings from personal services. In contrast, under this doctrine he
would sometimes be permitted to minimize his taxes by an anticipatory assign-
ment of a life interest in earnings from property. The Court in the foregoing
quotation seems to justify this result by holding that earnings are always "in-
come," while a life estate is "property," and a transfer of "property" is effec-
tive to redirect income. If, as the courts have said, taxation is not to be
governed by conveyancing concepts, it is hard to justify the persistence of the
distinction between assignment of earnings and assignment of income from a
life estate.
69. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Falk v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806
(3d Cir. 1951); Stix v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1945); Mallinckrodt v.
Nunan, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945). The so-called "Mallinckrodt rule" has been incorpo-
rated in § 678 of the 1954 Code. See cases cited in notes 75-81 infra.
70. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1941).
71. Id. at 583-84.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decisions cannot be argued away, and they
seem to have adopted the compromise view. There is some ethical justification
for the compromise. If the donor "cuts the string" on his gift it seems proper
to relieve him of tax: if the term of the assignment or other circumstances
demonstrate that he still retains power to exercise substantial control or indicia
of ownership over what he purports to give away, the income should be taxed
to him. Solving the problem by judicial inclusion and exclusion here may be
slow but it is not impossible; and it currently appears to be the only predictable
line of approach to these cases in the absence of specific statutory provisions.
"Contrdl" over Past Incone from Properly
It has been noted that where a right to income from personal earnings has
arisen, the holder of that right cannot minimize his tax by redirecting the in-
come to another; for income is taxed to the one who earns it. The same result
should, of course, follow in the case of earnings from property owned by the
taxpayer. As to earnings which have arisen from property, the cases demon-
strate that the two rules are coextensive. Income from property was involved
when the Supreme Court observed that "the power to dispose of income is the
equivalent to ownership of it"' 2 and that "income that is subject to a man's
unfettered command... may be taxed to him as his own income, whether he
sees fit to enjoy it or not."73 No reason exists, in logic or precedent, for dis-
tinguishing between assignment of income from earnings and income from
property in these circumstances. None is made in the cases.
"Control" over Future Income from Propcrty
As to control of future earnings from property-as distinguished from con-
trol of the property itself-the principal cases arise in the trust field. Under
the "Clifford Regulation" 74-- and now under sections 674 and 676-a settlor
who retains the power to substitute himself as beneficiary or change the bene-
ficiaries is considered taxable on the income as though he received it. A ran-
dom selection of cases in the area illustrates the application of this principle
prior to the adoption of the new Code. The "control" doctrine was emphasized
where income was taxed to the respective donors of crossed trusts who re-
tained controls over the income,7 r and frequently has been invoked to impose
tax on persons having power to direct trust income to themselves. It is like-
72. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940). Here, interest cupons %, cre de-
tached from bonds and given to the donee after the interest had in effect been earned,
but immediately before the due date of the coupons.
73. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930). See also Austin v. Commissioner,
161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947); Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 9S0 (101h
Cir. 1946).
74. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-21 (1953).
75. Edward E. Bishop, 4 T.C. 862 (1945).
76. Clearly where a person has the power to take income from a trust at his discreti, n
by revocation or otherwise, that income is taxed to him whether he takes it or nut, subject
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wise invoked in cases where a donor reserved effective control over payment
of dividends previously assigned to a donee.77 Another element of "control"
in cases involving trusts is present where the grantor retains the right to
change the beneficiaries of a trust, by naming anyone save himself. The latter
device has proved successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others.71 It
should be unsuccessful in all.7 9
In sum, the cases dealing with assigned income in terms of control fall into
patterns which are logical and reasonably complete. The doctrines arising
from these patterns are relevant to an equitable distribution of the tax burden.
They have been reasonably consistent, and have provided adequate guides by
which taxpayer and Commissioner may fairly predict the tax consequences of
typical and recurrent transactions.
to the qualifications of the Blair and Schaffner cases. Grant v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d
891 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Bunting v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Emery v.
Commissioner, 156 F.2d 728 (1st Cir. 1946); Whitehead v. Commissioner, 148 F,2d 718
(4th Cir. 1945) ; Frank v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1944) ; St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. United States, 143 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1944); Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d
425 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Eleanor M. Funk, 14 T.C. 198 (1950); Adolphus Busch, III, 3 T.C.
547 (1944). This rule is incorporated in the 1954 Code at §§ 674, 676, 678. See also
cases cited note 69 supra.
77. Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d
684 (2d Cir. 1942); Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 95 F. Supp. 759 (N.D.N.Y. 1951); B.O.
Mahaffey, 1 T.C. 176 (1942). The result in the Horst case directly supports such a con-
clusion. Cf. Van Sciver v. Rothensies, 122 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1941).
78. Compare Commissioner v. Bateman, 127 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1942) ; May Chandler
Goodan, 12 T.C. 817 (1949) ; Carman v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 717 (Ct. Cl. 1948),
with Steckel v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1946) ; George v. Commissioner, 143
F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1944).
79. This device will prove successful hereafter only if the requirements of IT. Itv.
CoDE. oF 1954, § 674 are met.
Cases not infrequently arise where there is an anticipatory assignment for a considera-
tion, of earnings that the assignor might otherwise have received from property. These
cases apply the same rules as the cases involving gratuitous transfers. For example, the
assignor has been taxed where he assigned future income from royalties to his attorney,
Lansill v. Burnet, 58 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1932); or as trustee directed a corporation
to pay dividends directly to beneficiaries, Muir v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 819 (4th Cir.
1950). Likewise, capital gain on stocks sold by a mortgagee and applied on the mortgagor's
debt was taxed to the mortgagor. Cooperative Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 1017
(9th Cir. 1940). See also Maurice A. Mittelman, 5 T.C. 932 (1945). A leading case in
this area is United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 279 U.S. 732 (1929), where a lessor
was taxed with income which accrued to it because the lessee paid taxes owed by the
lessor. See also Commissioner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
Under the 1954 Code lease problems are governed in part by § 110. Another leading case
is United States v. Joliet & Chicago R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942), imposing tax oil a corpora-
tion with respect to amounts paid to its stockholders at the request of the corporation.
See note 56 supra. It has been suggested, however, that the same doctrines should not
be applied to anticipatory assignments of income that are gratuitous and those that are
not. Domelley v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1939); Commissioner v. First
State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1948) (dissent) ; Estate of Laugh-
lin, 8 T.C. 33, 45 (1947) (concurring opinion).
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"Control" as Retention of Powers over the Corpus
During the discussion of the "property" concept, reference was made to the
nature of the problems that arise when a taxpayer assigns property to a donee
but retains substantial controls over the corpus.80 Since the donor has patently
parted with property, it might be urged that subsequent income from that
property should be taxed to the donee. This result would seem to follow even
though the donor retained substantial controls approximating the sum total of
ownership but short of legal title to the property from which the income arises.
The same result would also seem to follow as a matter of logic if he gave only
income from the property, since the right to income is itself a species of prop-
erty. The deficiencies of this concept-which would make virtually any assign-
ment effective for tax purposes-are such that the courts have sought other
tests of taxability more relevant to equitable distribution of the tax burden.
One obvious modification of the "property" concept is expressed in the view
that a taxpayer may not effectively redirect income to another for tax purposes
if he retains substantial control over the basic property from which the income
arises. Sometimes this view is expressed in simple terms of "control," as in
the observation that "where the donor retains control of the trust property the
income is taxable to him although paid to the donee." 8' In other cases it is
emphasized that the controls and powers retained by the donor may be such
as to make it proper to treat him as the owner.82 Sometimes both aspects are
emphasized.83 In all cases the distinction from the "property" concept is
manifest: the retention of powers and control over a corpus by a donor may
frustrate redirection of income to a donee even though some kind of owner-
ship of some kind of property passes to the latter.
80. See text at note 17 supra.
81. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940). See also Brown v. Commissioner,
131 F2d 640, 641 (3d Cir. 1942) : "The factors are not the niceties of title but the controls
retained by the settlor." In the gift and leaseback context, see White v. Fitzpatrick, 193
F.2d 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1951) : "The sole practical effect of these transactions, therefore,
was to create a right to income in the wife while leaving untouched in all practical reality
the husband-donor's effective dominion and control over the properties in question."
82. DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 685 (1933).
83. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940):
"[T]he short duration of the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the
retention of control over the corpus ... all lead irresistibly to the conclusiun that
respondent continued to be the owner for purposes of § 22(a).
"So far as his dominion and control were concerned it seems clear that the trust
did not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over the curpus
was in all essential respects the same after the trust was created, as before. The
wide powers which he retained included for all practical purposes most uf the
control which he as an individual would have.....
Similarly, in White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 401 (2d Cir. 1951), it was suggested
that a donor who transferred interests in property should nevertheless be taxed on the
income therefrom since there wvas a "transfer, in effect, of the right to receive income
and the retention of those complex of 'use rights' which are usually compressed in the
term 'ownership.' "
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The "control" doctrine has been applied to numerous cases. In some of the
earlier decisions it was used to frustrate attempted redirection of income through
family partnerships.8 4 Transfers of interests in literary properties s1 and in
patents 86 have been held ineffective to redirect income under this theory. The
doctrine has likewise been invoked to strike down arrangements by which a
taxpayer assigns property to a member of his family and thereafter makes pay-
ments to him as rental or royalty with respect to the property.87 Yet another
illustration of the operation of the rule is a case where a taxpayer sold stock
to a son who borrowed money for payment from the father's bank. Although
the father did not own the stock it was held that the dividends therefrom were
taxable to him rather than the son. The court drew a distinction between an
intention "actually to divest himself of beneficial ownership" and an intention
"to create the appearance of a genuine transfer so as to avoid or reduce the
payment of income taxes while really maintaining control of the property .... ."8 8
In cases where a donor has put property in trust but retained control over it
in some measure, it has also been said that the power to dispose of income is
84. M.M. Monroe, 7 T.C. 278 (1946); Daniel J. Fry, 4 T.C. 1045 (1945). But see
Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). The general subject of partnerships is considered at
notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
85. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1949). See Sax Rohmer, 14
T.C. 1467 (1950). But see Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1949).
86. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948):
"The taxpayer's purported assignment to his wife of the various license contracts
may properly be said to have left him with something more than a memory. He
retained very substantial interests in the contracts themselves, as well as power to
control the payment of royalties to his wife, thereby satisfying the various criteria
of taxability set forth in the Clifford-Horst group of cases."
87. White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951); Dickey v. Burnet, 56 F.2d
917 (8th Cir. 1.932) ; Estate of Dodson, 1 T.C. 416 (1943). The Commissioner now
seeks to control this device by denying a deduction for amounts paid as royalty or rentals
pursuant to such arrangements, on the theory that the donor properly should be treated
as though he were still the owner of the property. Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. The
issue, however, is far from settled. See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.
1950) ; Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). For a comprehensive and
penetrating study of the problem, see Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale, or Gift, and
Leaseback Transactions, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1948). Cases upholding the taxpayer in this
area do not reject the "control" concept as here applicable. They just ignore it. For a
case turning on partnership arrangements involving sale and leaseback, see Albert T. Felix,
21 T.C. 794 (1954).
88. Gouldman v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 686, 689 (4th Cir. 1948). In another case
similar in effect the court did not relate its decision to the existence of control over prop-
erty but rather to the existence of a pretended transaction. In that case a husband gave
his wife money which she put in trust to be loaned back to him. The court concluded
that the "interest" paid thereon was actually a gift, since the husband did not in fact give
the money but only gave the interest. Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936).
Since Sunnen v. Commissioner, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), it may be hoped that assignments of
any kind of contract with respect to basic income producing property retained by the
donor will be ineffective to redirect income from donor to donee.
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the equivalent to ownership of it.89 The "control" concept was likewise used
in striking down an arrangement whereby corporation stockholders gave their
wives stock with very limited rights; it was held that amounts paid to the
wives should be taxed to the husbands.90 Assignment of rentals has been
treated in the same way.9 '
Leaving to one side the cases involving assignments of patents, copyrights
and trademarks as such, it seems clear that the "control" doctrine should be
applicable to assignments of subsidiary rights with respect to such properties.
That is, if a taxpayer retains substantial interests in such property as a patent,
even a complete disposition of a contract or agreement related thereto should
not serve to redirect income arising out of the patent. This result certainly
should follow if, as the Supreme Court has so frequently stated, property
concepts are irrelevant in this area. The rule to be adopted is illustrated by
the Sunen case, 92 where it was emphasized that control retained by the donor
over the basic property was sufficient to frustrate redirection of income. Such
a rule ought equally to apply to assignments of rental agreements where the
basic property rented is retained by the donor.
This raises the question of how the courts should treat a donor who gives
away a life estate in Blackacre but retains the reversion. The answer should
be that if the donor does not in fact retain any control over the property
except that which he normally would have as reversioner, then he has divided
his interest just as though he had given the donee in fee a physical portion of
Blackacre. But where he retains other substantial rights with respect to the
entire property, whether as controls, use rights or other indicia of ownership,
income from the property should be taxed to him.
Under just what circumstances it will be found that a person has retained
89. See, e.g., Steckel v. Commissioner, 154 F2d 4 (6th Cir. 1946); Ferdinand A.
Bower, 10 T.C. 37 (1948) ; I.A. Wyant, 6 T.C. 565 (1946). See also Lowery v. Helvering,
70 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1934) (no control retained; donor escapes taxation).
90. Anderson v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1947); Overton v. Commis-
sioner, 162 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Sewell v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 957 (Ct. Cl.
1947). The same result has been reached in a trust arrangement. Lyman A. Stanton,
14 T.C. 217 (1950). See also Loretto M6. Richards, 19 T.C. 366 (1952). where a tax-
payer assigned to a trustee "legal title" to a "beneficial interest" in stock h owned. All
income from the stock was taxed to the taxpayer because he retained "substantial and
important attributes of ownership of the stock." Id. at 376.
A somewhat dubious case is Lewis Y. O'Malley, 49 F. Supp. 173 (D. Neb. 1943).
where an unclear opinion suggests that a stockholder might be taxed on income arising
from a corporate liquidation for the reason that he controlled the corporation. Reference
was made to the doctrine that income subject to the unfettered command of an indi-
vidual was taxable to him whether he enjoyed it or not. See also Bishop v. Shaughnessy,
195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952).
91. "Petitioner has retained everything except the right to receive fractions of the
income for a term of years." Arthur T. Gait, 19 T.C. 892, 904 (1953), aff'd, 216 F2d
41 (7th Cir. 1954). See als6 J.E. Vincent, 19 T.C. 501, 527 (1952). But see Edward
G. Swvartz, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1934).
92. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
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such control over property from which income arises as to be taxable thereon
cannot be predicted with certainty. It has been noted that the Supreme Court
has specifically left the line to be drawn by future decisions ;"3 but in drawing
this line, the courts are not left entirely without guidance or direction. There
are special statutory sections dealing with the redirection of income through
trust devices, 94 and it would seem proper that the standards applicable to trust
devices should be taken as guides in the cases involving devices other than
trusts.95 The principal distinction between the two is that in the trust arrange-
ment a transferor may seek to maintain control of the property by placing
control of the corpus in a third person who is subject to his will. This avenue
is not open to the person who transfers property directly to a donee but never-
theless seeks to retain control of it. But if the transfer is made under such
circumstances-familial or other-that the donor as a practical matter may be
expected to dominate the donee, this should obviously be a factor in determin-
ing whether the donor should be taxed on income arising from the corpus.
The amount of the control retained by the donor is material no matter which
device the donor used to redirect his income: the trust device offers more
opportunities for retaining controls over property ostensibly given away, and
for that reason it has been the subject of extensive statutory regulation.
In drawing the line of taxability in terms of "control," the courts will be
given direction by a governing principle which is-unlike the "property" con-
93. See text at note 71 supra.
94. INT. RFv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 672-75. It should be noted that although these new
provisions of the 1954 Code embody many features of the "Clifford Regulation," there
is no corresponding enactment of statutory criteria regarding the anticipatory assignment
of income by non-trust devices. These criteria are quite obviously left to the courts for a case
by case determination of what constitutes income. The Senate Finance Committee Report
with respect to the new Code recites in part that no items of a trust shall be included
in the income of a grantor by reason of § 61. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
365 (1954). This statement is elaborated as follows:
"However, this provision does not affect the principles governing the taxability of
income to a grantor or assignor other than by reason of his dominion and control
over the trust. Thus, this subpart has no application in situations involving assign-
ments of future income to the assignor, as in Lucas v. Earl (281 U.S. 111),
Harrison v. Schaffner (312 U.S. 579), and Helvcring v. Horst (311 U.S. 112),
whether or not the assignment is to a trust; nor are the rules as to family partner-
ships affected by this subpart. This subpart also has no application in determining
the right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust under a transfer and
leaseback arrangement."
95. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the leading case dealing with trusts,
emphasized that the essential factors to be weighed in determining whether the settlor
of a trust was taxable with respect to the income received by it were: the term of the
trust, the closeness of the relationship between donor and donee, and the degree of control
retained by the settlor over income and corpus. Clifford has frequently been cited in
non-trust cases; and the Horst, Hort and Schaffner cases, which involved assignments
directly to the donees, have frequently been referred to in trust cases. As the Court
remarked in Schaffner, there is no reason for any distinction in principle between the
two types of cases. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (19,1).
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cept- meaningful in relation to the basic purpose of equitable and practical
administration of the revenue laws.
CONCLUSION
There are two current theories which, though popular, are thoroughly in-
adequate to establish sound rules of taxation where gratuitous anticipatory
assignments of income are concerned. The "flow of satisfactions" concept
proves too much: if it were literally adopted every transfer of income-produc-
ing property would create tax liability in the donor measured by the amount
of the subsequent income even if the donor "cut the string" completely. This
cannot be the law. In contrast, the concept that income follows ownership of
property proves too little. Everything capable of transfer may be said to be
property; anticipatory assignments would always be successful if it were neces-
sary to prove only that there was a transfer of property when the anticipatory
assignment was made.
On the other hand, the rule that income must be taxed to the person who
earns it has been applied with logic and consistency in most cases and is a
helpful guide through the decisions respecting anticipatory assignment of in-
come. It has not been-although it should be-applied in all cases where
donors embody their earnings or their personal services in capital assets which
they gratuitously assign. The basic principle of tax liability in this area arises
from the concept that control by the donor over income or the source of income
assigned requires that the income be taxed to him. Judicial understanding of
and adherence to the last two doctrines will lead to equitable and predictable
results in cases involving gratuitous anticipatory assignments of income.
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